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INTRODUCTION
The Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)1 recognizes that trade is
not an end in itself, but rather that sustained economic growth
must be pursued in the broader context of sustainable
development and protection of the environment. 2
Notwithstanding this consensus among the Members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), trade and the environment remain
controversial political topics. The WTO Agreement is under
attack by environmentalists in the United States and abroad who
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(1986); Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M. (1999). Bruce Neuling is a Foreign
Service Officer with the U.S. State Department who has served in Brazil, Sri Lanka, and
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Service. The views expressed in this Article are the author's and do not necessarily
represent the official position of the U.S. State Department.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, preamble,
Dec. 15, 1993,33 I.L.M. 15, 15 (1994).
2. See id.
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believe that its rules have been used to undermine environmental
protection. The sustained nature of these attacks, and the inability
of free traders and environmentalists to find common ground to
discuss their differences, suggest that the problem is deeper than a
mere disagreement over policy. It appears that a clash of cultures
has arisen. Environmentalists regard the environment as
immeasurably more important than trade, which they view simply
as a monetary issue. Additionally, they are impatient with
arguments that environmental regulations are justifiable only in
terms of cost/benefit and must conform to international trade
rules. On the other hand, free traders view environmentalists as
woolly-headed and animated by an anti-business bias. These
radically different perspectives have generated intense debate, but
there has been little, if any, progress toward a consensus, or at the
least, a mutual understanding.
3
In one sense, the "trade versus environment" debate is
overstated and perhaps even artificial. The development and
growth of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
4
system has coincided with growing environmental awareness and
sustained strengthening of environmental standards in developed
countries. Therefore, it is untenable to contend that free trade and
environmental protection are inherently in conflict. A series of
cases involving GAT and the WTO, however, demonstrate that
trade laws and environmental protection clash under certain
circumstances. This Article discusses a recent WTO case, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(Shrimp-Turtle),5 as a vehicle for exploring the trade and
environmental landscape. Parts I and II of this Article consider
how trade measures designed to protect the environment can clash
with the basic features and rules in the WTO Agreement. Part III
of this Article analyzes the "environmental exception" in Article
XX of GAT" and queries whether Article XX was intended to
3. See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATI': TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FUTURE 36-41 (1994).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 196,
198,200 [hereinafter GATI].
5. See World Trade Organization: United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Report I; World Trade Organization: United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, May 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter Dispute
Panel Report I].
[Vol. 22:1
1999] The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for GATT 3
serve an environmental purpose. Part IV reviews several WTO
and GATT cases from the 1990s that prefigured Shrimp-Turtle and
examined many of the interpretive issues addressed therein. Parts
V and VI of this Article analyze the impact of Shrimp-Turtle on
WTO and GATT jurisprudence and discuss the implications of the
case within the larger scope of the trade-environment debate.
Finally, Part VII of this Article cautiously speculates whether
Shrimp-Turtle could lay the foundation for a compromise between
the WTO regime and legitimate environmental interests.
I. BASIC FEATURES OF THE WTO SYSTEM
Before discussing how a trade measure intended to protect
the environment conflicts with the rules of the WTO Agreement, it
is helpful to review three basic features of the WTO system. First,
a WTO Member is generally required to confer "most-favored-
nation" treatment on products imported from other member
nations. 6 Second, a WTO Member may not impose domestic
regulations or measures that discriminate against imports in favor
of local products.7  Finally, subject to a narrow range of
exceptions, a WTO Member may not impose non-tariff border
restrictions on imports or exports. 8 Because the vast majority of
environmental policies do not clash with these rules, potential
conflict with the WTO exists only in a small number of cases.
Nevertheless, the number and importance of these cases has grown
in recent years as WTO Members have placed increasing emphasis
on environmental protection.
GATT's "most-favored-nation" provision is found in Article I
of the Agreement.9 It prohibits WTO Members from singling out
trading partners for special privileges. Article I states:
With respect to custom duties and charges of any kind ... and
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation . . . any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other
6. See GATT art. I.
7. See id. art. III.
8. See id.
9. See id. art. 1.
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contracting parties.10
Although there are exceptions to this rule, such as the
exception for customs unions11 and free trade areas, 12 a product
imported from a WTO Member is generally entitled to the same
treatment afforded a "like" product from any country. 13 For
example, according to WTO rules, it would be illegal for the
United States to maintain a five-percent tariff on Japanese cars,
while subjecting German cars to a ten-percent tariff.
Article III obligates WTO Members to extend national tax
and regulatory treatment to products imported from other WTO
Members.14 Article III deals with taxation and states that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products.
15
Similarly, Article III deals with regulation of products:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.16
In other words, a product imported from another WTO
Member must be taxed and regulated no less favorably than a
"like" domestic product. Unless an exception applies, it is illegal
under the WTO rules to impose a ten-percent excise tax on
domestic beer and a twenty-percent excise tax on imported beer,
or to subject imported beer to special regulations from which
domestic beer is exempt.
Finally, Article XI prohibits quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports, and obligates WTO parties to convert non-
tariff trade barriers into tariffs (with some exceptions not
10. Id. art. I, para. 1.
11. See id. art. XXIV, para. 2.
12. See id. art. I, para. 2; Annex A.
13. See id. art. III, para. 2.
14. See id. art. III.
15. Id. art. III, para. 2.
16. Id.
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important here). 17 Article XI states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
18
Using tariffs, instead of non-tariff barriers, enhances the
transparency of the trade regime, allowing for precise knowledge
regarding levels of protection. Transparency, in turn, facilitates
the negotiation of lower tariffs. One of the great successes of
GATT was the overseeing of a series of multilateral negotiation
rounds between 1947 and 1994 that resulted in reduced tariffs on
most traded products.
1 9
GATT is a long, complex document with many rules and
exceptions, including the exception in Article XX, which contains
important implications for environmental protection.20 At the risk
of oversimplification, however, the rules in Articles I, III, and XI
are the backbone of the WTO system. 21 They have successfully
minimized the incidence of gross trade discrimination and non-
transparency. As a result, global competition has been enhanced
and the world's output increased. Nevertheless, these rules have
the potential to clash with trade measures taken to protect the
environment.
II. How Do WTO RULES CONFLICT WITH ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY?
The vast majority of environmental measures pose little or no
risk of clashing with the WTO rules, even when they impose a
burden on trade. Suppose, for example, that a country passes a
non-discriminatory law prohibiting automobiles from emitting
more than a certain amount of pollution. Foreign automobile
manufacturers might have to alter their automobiles in order to
17. See id. art. XI.
18. Id. art. XI, para. 1.
19. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 73-78 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the trade
negotiation rounds and GAT's evolution).
20. See GATT art. XX.
21. See id. arts. 1, 111, XI.
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sell them in the local market, but this law would not result in less
favorable treatment for foreign cars as compared to domestic cars.
Local manufacturers would operate under the same burden and
not gain an advantage over foreign competition. Under the
circumstances, Article III would probably permit this law.
22 Most
environmental measures are similar to this example.
23
In other cases, however, the non-discrimination rules of
Articles I and 111,24 and the prohibition of non-tariff border
measures in Article XI,25 could inhibit regulatory action and
complicate environmental protection. Consider the case of a
country that bans all agricultural uses of the pesticide methyl
bromide because it contributes to ozone layer depletion. Local
farmers would be forced to use alternative pesticides that are more
costly and less effective. Their production costs would rise and
their products would become less competitive in world markets.
Meanwhile, methyl bromide would still be used in foreign
countries, giving those farmers a competitive edge.
Notwithstanding the sacrifices of local producers, the ozone layer
would still be at risk. Under these circumstances, could a trade
measure alleviate the local farmers' predicament and/or contribute
to global environmental protection? Could the country, for
example:
1. Ban imports of agricultural products produced with
methyl bromide in order to preserve the domestic
market for local farmers?
2. Ban imports of these products in order to discourage the
use of methyl bromide abroad and thus contribute to the
protection of the ozone layer?
3. Impose a tax on the imports to equal the extra costs that
domestic farmers incur by using alternative pesticides?
Political pressure to use such trade measures would be strong.
Some of the pressure would be protectionist in nature, but most of
it would be well intended and motivated by a desire to protect the
environment. It is unlikely, however, that any of these measures
22. See id. art. III.
23. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 235.
24. See GATT arts. I, III.
25. See id. art. XI.
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would survive scrutiny under Articles I, III, or XI, although they
may be protected by an exception. Unlike the automobile
example, where an import ban was not used to achieve an
environmental goal, and the emissions regulation was applied in a
non-discriminatory fashion to domestic and foreign cars alike, the
ban on importation of crops produced with methyl bromide
clashes with Article XI's prohibition of "restrictions other than
duties, taxes, or other charges .... "26 In addition, a ban in the
latter case does not seem to fall into one of the limited exceptions
of Article XX.27  It could also clash with the obligation of
"national treatment" under Article III, because goods banned at
the border plainly receive less favorable treatment than "like"
goods produced and marketed domestically. 28 The domestic ban
only addresses the use of methyl bromide, and crops are not per se
banned. Similarly, Article I would not permit a ban that
discriminates between foreign crops produced with methyl
bromide and those produced without it, if the crops were
otherwise "like" products.2
9
The fact that methyl bromide was used in the production of
foreign crops would not distinguish them from domestic crops
produced without methyl bromide. Broadly speaking, goods are
"like" products within the meaning of Article I and Article III if
they are directly competitive.30 The fact that they are produced by
different processes or production methods (known as "PPMs" in
the literature) does not mean that they are "unlike" and treated as
such. In determining whether products are "like" products for the
purposes of Article I and Article III, GATT Dispute Panels
examine factors such as "the product's end-uses in a given market;
consumers' tastes and habits; and the product's properties, nature
and quality."31 How the product was made is usually not relevant.
In GATT jurisprudence, a car is a car, whether or not it is
assembled by workers who are free to organize unions; lumber is
lumber, whether or not it was made from trees harvested in an
environmentally sound manner; and a strawberry is a strawberry,
26. Id.
27. See id. art. XX.
28. See id. art. Ill, para. 2.
29. See id. art. III.
30. See id.
31. Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83, 100 (1988).
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whether or not it was grown in fields treated with methyl bromide.
In contrast, the production process is very important from an
environmental protection point of view. Thus, proper treatment of
PPMs under GATT is one of the core issues in the trade and
environment debate.
Although a border tax designed to offset the extra costs
imposed on domestic farmers is less Draconian than an import
ban, it too could clash with GATT. Article II prohibits the
imposition of a border tax on imported goods unless an equivalent
internal tax is imposed on domestic products. 32 In the crop
example, internal taxes were not imposed on domestic crops
produced with methyl bromide. The tax on imports is therefore
problematic, even though it merely offsets the extra burden on
farmers. Article II also permits a border charge on a product to
offset foreign subsidies, but regulatory burdens imposed on
domestic producers are not treated by the WTO as subsidies to
foreign producers.
33
Similarly, the import ban could not be justified under the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.34 Article II of the Agreement permits a WTO Member
to take measures to protect humans, animals, and plants within its
borders from diseases, pest-infestation, and the like. It also
protects against risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins,
32. GAT Article II reads:
Nothing in this Article [which deals with the Schedule of tariff concessions] shall
prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on the importation of
any product: (a) a charge equivalent to any internal tax imposed consistently
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III in respect of the like domestic
product....
GATT art. II, para. 2.
33. See id. art. II, para. 2(b). Businesses often argue that high environmental
standards undermine their competitiveness vis-A-vis imports. Some environmentalists
support "green" countervailing duties as a way to offset this extra burden. Article I of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, however, defines "subsidy" as a
"financial contribution" by a government that confers a "benefit" on a local producer. See
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Sept. 27, 1994, art. 1, available in
1994 WL 761793 (G.A.T.T.). Other governments can countervail this subsidy by imposing
a duty on those imported products that benefited from it. See GAT!' art. II, para. 2(b).
Imposition of a regulatory burden on domestic producers does not confer a countervailing
subsidy on its foreign competitors. See id. art. IV, para. 2.
34. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 121 (3d ed. 1995)
(referring to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Sept. 27, 1994, available in 1994 WL 761638 (G.A.T.T.)).
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or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs.3
5
The Agreement permits a WTO Member to ban food imports with
harmful levels of methyl bromide residue.36 It would not permit,
however, a ban of otherwise safe food imports merely because the
production method posed a threat to the ozone layer. In short,
unilateral trade measures to protect the environment could clash
with the standards in Articles I, III, and XI. Unless rescued by an
exception elsewhere in GATT, they could very well fail a WTO
challenge.
It is important to note that Articles I, III, and XI do not
distinguish between unilateral and multilateral measures. This is
important because Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs) have proliferated in recent decades as nations have
recognized that many environmental problems have important
transboundary dimensions. MEAs have multiple parties and are
usually designed to address particular environmental problems.
Some rely on trade measures to achieve their goals. For example,
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Protocol) 37  provides for the phase out of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals that deplete the
ozone layer. CFCs have a variety of industrial uses and have been
an important item in international trade. The Protocol sets up a
complex scheme for phasing out the production and use of CFCs. 38
To reinforce the schedule and encourage non-parties to join, it
bans CFC trade with non-parties. 39
In addition, the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (Basel
Convention),40 regulates international shipments of hazardous
waste. Much of this waste, for example, scrap metal, is traded
internationally for recycling. The Basel Convention seeks to
minimize the generation of hazardous waste and prevent its
35. For a detailed definition of "sanitary or phytosanitary measure," see Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3(a).
36. See generally id.
37. See generally United Nations: Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
38. See id. art. 2.
39. See id.
40. See generally United Nations Environment Programme Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
649 (1989).
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shipment to countries lacking the capacity to handle it in an
environmentally sound manner. It establishes a system whereby
hazardous waste exporters must first notify and obtain consent
from the country of destination.41 It also prohibits most trade in
hazardous waste with non-parties.
42
Also, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)43 protects species from
over-exploitation caused by international trade.44 The degree of
regulation depends on the level of danger faced by the species.
45
If plants and animals are threatened with extinction, commercial
trade is prohibited.46  Commercial trade that impacts less-
endangered species can face prohibition if the exporting country
believes it detrimental to the species' survival.47 Appendices
specify the species subject to coverage. Tens of thousands are
currently covered.48
As of 1994, approximately twenty MEAs were in force, most
limited to specific regions or animals.49 Their memberships vary
and do not overlap completely with that of the WTO.50
Because MEAs and the WTO have developed on separate
tracks, their rules do not necessarily mesh well. Banning trade of
CFCs or scrap metal could clash with GATT Articles III and XI.
Also, discriminating between MEA parties and non-parties could
violate GATT Article I if WTO obligations are owed to the non-
parties. Moreover, the tendency of MEAs to focus on the
environmental effects of the production, use, and disposal of a
product, rather than on the product itself, is out of sync with
traditional GATT/WTO jurisprudence. 51 Similarly, the use of
trade measures against non-MEA parties in order to influence
their domestic policies could clash with certain GATT/WTO cases
that disfavor extraterritorial application of domestic
41. See id. art. 6, para. 2.
42. See id. art. 4, para. 5.
43. See generally Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (1976).
44. See id. preamble.
45. See generally id. art. II.
46. See id. art. III, para. 3(a)-(c).
47. See id. art. IV, para. 2(a).
48. See generally id. apps. I-Ill.
49. See generally ESTY, supra note 3, at 275-281.
50. See generally id. at 218-220.
51. See generally id. at 220-221.
[Vol. 22:1
1999] The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for GATT 11
environmental standards.
52
In the event of a conflict between an MEA and the WTO
Agreement, it is not clear which rules apply. According to Article
30 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
53
1. [T]he rights and obligations of States parties to successive
treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined
in accordance with the following paragraphs....
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to
the later treaty ... the earlier treaty applies only to the extent
that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty.
54
What this means is that the later treaty will prevail. It is
unclear, however, whether MEAs and the WTO Agreement
concern the "same subject-matter." If they do not, then the
Vienna Convention's later-in-time rule would not apply.55  A
dispute between two countries that are parties to both an MEA
and the WTO could arise. This is less likely, however, than a
dispute between a country that is a party to both the WTO
Agreement and an MEA, and a country that is not a party to that
MEA. Suppose that Japan, a party to the Basel Convention,
banned hazardous waste shipments to the United States because
the United States had not ratified the Basel Convention. Would it
avail the United States to bring a WTO case against Japan
invoking Articles III and XI? The Vienna Convention indicates
that the answer is yes. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention
provides:
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the
parties to the earlier one: ... (b) as between a State party to
both treaties [Japan, in our example] and a State party to only
one of the treaties [the United States], the treaty to which both
States are parties [the WTO Agreement, in this example]
governs their mutual rights and obligations. 56
52. See generally id. at 218-220. For the proposition that environmentalists fear
GATT or the WTO may override certain international agreements, see id. at 218.
53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
54. Id. art. 30.
55. See id.
56. It art. 30, para. 4.
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Therefore, GATT] rules would govern this dispute. The
Vienna Convention provides no practical guidance on how the
country that is a party to both treaties is to reconcile conflicting
legal obligations. In addition, it is unclear where such a case
should be heard. If the dispute is between two MEA parties, it
could be dealt with by the MEA's dispute process. The
challenging country, however, might bring the case in the WTO on
the assumption that it would get a friendlier hearing in that forum.
As a result, the dispute might only reach the MEA if the parties
agreed to do so, or if it was removed by a decision of the WTO
Panel. If the dispute, however, was between an MEA party and a
non-party, the challenging country could only bring the matter to
the WTO.57  Where that leaves the environmental interests
protected by the MEA is an open question.
III. THE ARTICLE XX EXCEPTION -A SAFE HAVEN FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES?
Trade measures used for environmental purposes have the
potential to clash with core WTO policies in Articles I, III, XI, and
elsewhere. Article XX on General Exceptions, however, lays out a
number of specific circumstances under which WTO parties may
be exempted from WTO rules.58 Two of these are relevant for
environmental protection. Article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
countries prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures: . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health; . . . [or] (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption; .... 59
57. See ESTY, supra note 3, at 219.
58. See GATT art. XX.
59. Id. Article XX also has exceptions for measures to protect or promote: public
morals; the preservation of national artistic and archeological treasures; customs
enforcement; competition laws; patents, trademarks, and copyrights; to block the
importation of products of prison labor; and so forth. See id.
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Paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX allow WTO Members to
adopt policies that discriminate, deny national treatment, or are
otherwise inconsistent with GATT. 60  This, however, is only
acceptable if the measures are "necessary" to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health, which together can be taken to
mean "environment," or related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if taken in conjunction with domestic
restrictions.61 The measures are acceptable as long as they do not
result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade. 62
But what exactly do these paragraphs mean? Given that
Article XX is central to the effort to carve out a space for the
environment in GATT, it is striking that the word "environment"
does not actually appear therein. Also questionable is how well
suited the phraseology of paragraphs (b) and (g) is to the goal of
giving governments elbowroom to pursue environmental
measures. The environment was not a significant public issue
when GATT was negotiated in the late 1940s.
Although the negotiating history for Article XX is limited and
leaves many questions unanswered, it does shed some light on
what the negotiators intended.63 The preamble to Article XX
stemmed from the International Convention for the Abolition of
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (1927
Convention), a treaty negotiated under the auspices of the League
of Nations in 1927, but never put into effect. 64  The 1927
Convention called for the abolition of all trade barriers, excluding
tariffs. 65  It did contain a number of customary exceptions,
however, such as for sanitary and quarantine purposes, subject to
the conditions "that they are not applied in such a manner as to
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between foreign
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade." 66
60. See generally id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GA TT
Article XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37,38-47 (1991).
64. See id. at 41 (referring to the International Convention for the Abolition of
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461, 97 L.N.T.S.
393 (not in force)).
65. See id.
66. Id. at 42.
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The first draft of GATT came in the proposal by the United
States and Great Britain in December 1945.67 It provided for the
customary exceptions to free trade, but permitted unconditional
applications.68 As the Netherlands and Belgium noted, however,
during the London session of the preparatory committee, "Indirect
protection is an undesirable and dangerous phenomenon ....
Many times the stipulations 'to protect animal or plant life or
health' are misused for indirect protection." 69 To address this
problem, the United Kingdom offered an amendment specifying
that trade measures could not be "applied in such a manner as to
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or as a disguised restriction on
international trade." 70 This formula is the basis for the preamble
to Article XX, which is borrowed from the 1927 Convention.
71
The exception, however, is that "arbitrary discrimination" no
longer applied just to foreign countries. Thus, Article XX
incorporates the principle of national treatment as well as non-
discrimination.
Article XX(b) is based on the proposal by the United States
and Great Britain, which included an exception for measures
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. ' 72
Numerous pre-GATr commercial treaties contain this formula in
what is almost boilerplate language. It was later modified to
require "corresponding safeguards under similar conditions" in the
importing country. 73  This modification, however, was later
abandoned because Article XX's preamble accomplished the same
purpose.74 There was no avowal of an environmental purpose
during the limited debate on Article XX(b), and the term
"sanitary" was commonly used to characterize this Article.75 It is
likely the negotiators intended for Article XX(b) only to exempt
national regulations designed to keep out unsafe food, block the
importation of products bearing pests, and so forth.
67. See id. at 43.
68. See id.
69. GATT SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 519 (6th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO GATT].
70. Charnovitz, supra note 63, at 44.
71. See id. at 41.
72. Id. at 44.
73. See id at 44 & n.43.
74. See GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 69, at 521.
75. See Charnovitz, supra note 63, at 44.
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Based on a 1946 U.S. proposal, Article XX(g) provided an
exception for measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are taken pursuant
to international agreements or are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. '76 This
language did not appear in any previous trade agreement.
Although there is no official statement of purpose for the
exception, it was possibly drafted with oil in mind.77 Throughout
the preparatory meetings, negotiators discussed the language of
Article XX(g) in terms of export, rather than import, restrictions,
and the conserved natural resource "was typically described as a
'raw material' or 'mineral.' 78 The term "exhaustible" natural
resource apparently meant stock resources, such as oil, in contrast
to renewable or flow resources, such as plants or animals.79 The
U.S. proposal ultimately was adopted with the deletion of "the
words 'taken pursuant to international agreements."' 80 Arguably,
GAT negotiators intended to specifically exempt national
regulations aimed at conserving resources, such as minerals or oil,
by prohibiting their exportation, as long as domestic conservation
measures applied also.
Based on the above, Article XX was not intended to shield
environmental measures from basic GATI disciplines.
Arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Steve Charnovitz, 81
for example, argues that environmental provisions were already in
existence in various laws and treaties at the time GATT was
negotiated, and that GATT should be construed in a manner
consistent with them. Charnovitz cites, for example, a 1911 treaty
between the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, and the United
States, that banned imports of seal skins taken in violation of the
treaty, in order to preserve and protect seals and sea otters.82
Other examples cited by Charnovitz include the 1933 London
Convention for the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their
Natural State, which prohibited trade in specified animals and
trophies from African countries without a certificate; and the U.S.
76. GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 69, at 521.
77. See Charnovitz, supra note 63, at 45.
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
79. See id.
80. Id (footnote omitted).
81. See generally id.
82. See id. at 39.
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Underwood Tariff of 1913, which banned imports of plumes and
feathers coming from specified wild birds.83 Charnovitz argues
that no GATT delegation contended that these pre-existing laws
and treaties were to be overridden by GATT.84 It is also possible,
however, that GATT negotiators were unaware of these treaties
and laws. If they were unknown to GATT negotiators, then the
question of whether GATT should make room for measures to
protect the environment was never an issue during the
negotiations. This interpretation is plausible because no reference
to these laws and treaties appears in the negotiating record, and
the environment was not a major public issue at the time.
In the final analysis, however, the negotiating history of
Article XX may not have much bearing on the Article's
interpretation. According to the Vienna Convention, terms in a
treaty are given their ordinary meaning, taking into consideration
their context and the object and purpose of the treaty. The
negotiating record becomes relevant only if this primary method
leaves the terms ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result that is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 85 Because the terms in Article
XX (b) and (g) are non-technical and reasonably clear, they can be
related to the object and purpose of GATT in an intelligible way.
Thus, the negotiating history may not be an issue. The ordinary
meaning of the words in paragraphs (b) and (g) seems to permit
many environmental measures that are otherwise inconsistent with
GATT. Certainly the phrases "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health '86 or "conservation of exhaustible
natural resources" 87 could support measures that go far beyond
83. See id. at 39-42 (citing the London Convention for the Preservation of Fauna and
Flora in their Natural State, art. 9, 172 L.N.T.S. 241,254 (1933) and the Tariff Act of 1913,
ch. 16, § 345, 38 Stat. 114, 148 (Underwood Tariff Act)).
84. See Charnovitz, supra note 63, at 44.
85. According to the Vienna Convention, Article 31, "[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." See Vienna Convention,
supra note 53, art. 31. Article 32 states:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion ... to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to [A]rticle 31: (a)
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Id. art. 32.
86. GATT art. XX.
87. Id.
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traditional sanitary and quarantine restrictions, or schemes to
conserve stockpiles of oil and metals. Even if this interpretive
strategy is successful, the fact remains that paragraphs (b) and (g)
were probably written for non-environmental reasons, and the
phraseology does not lend itself smoothly to environmental goals.
A moment's consideration of the language gives rise to many
questions. For example:
1. Why must measures protecting human, plant or animal
life be "necessary," when measures to conserve
exhaustible natural resources need only "relate to" that
goal?
2. What does the modifier "exhaustible" signify in
"exhaustible natural resources?" It must exclude
something for it to have an effect. Are renewable
natural resources, such as forests or animal species,
excluded? What could an inexhaustible natural resource
be other than a renewable natural resource?
3. Does the notion of "natural resources" refer only to
commercially-exploitable resources, such as oil or
manganese? Or is it broad enough to include non-
tradable "goods," such as clean air or the ozone layer?
4. Is the term "natural resources" in paragraph (g) broad
enough to include biological resources? If so, then is it
redundant with the plant and animal exception in
paragraph (b)?
5. Do either paragraph (b) or (g) permit a country to
protect the environment outside of its borders? If not,
then does this seriously limit the power of countries to
protect the global commons?
These and other questions serve as reminders that Article XX
was not intended to create a broad environmental exception in
GATT. Its conscription into this unnatural role leaves it an
ineffective tool for achieving environmental objectives.
IV. PRE-SHRIMP-TURTLE ARTICLE XX LITIGATION
In the 1990s, the putative environmental provisions of Article
XX were at the heart of several WTO/GATT cases. The results
disappointed environmentalists, further fostering their suspicion
that "trade bureaucrats" were incapable of taking a broad view of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the relationship between environmental protection and the world
trading system. The issues raised in these cases not only framed
the jurisprudence in Shrimp-Turtle, but also contributed to the
polarized political atmosphere in which trade and the environment
are continuously debated.
A. Thai Cigarettes
Although not an environmental case, the 1990 Panel Report
on Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes (Thai Cigarettes)88  has important environmental
implications. The Report interpreted the phrase "necessary to
protect human .. .life or health" in Article XX(b).89 The case
dealt with an import ban on cigarettes imposed by the Thai
Government. 90  The United States challenged the ban as a
violation of Article XI.91 In response, Thailand invoked Article
XX(b), arguing that the ban was necessary to protect the public
from harmful ingredients in imported cigarettes and to reduce the
consumption of cigarettes in Thailand. 92 The Panel rejected the
Thai Government's argument on the ground that "[t]he import
restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be
'necessary' in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no
alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or
less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be
expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives."
93
The Panel reasoned that alternative methods consistent with
GATT, such as advertising restrictions and mandatory labeling,
were available to Thailand to achieve its public health objectives.
94
Therefore, the import ban was not "necessary" within the terms of
Article XX.95
88. See Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
adopted Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991).
89. See id. at 222.
90. See id. at 200.
91. See generally id. at 222.
92. See id. at 223.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 224.
95. See id. In the November 1990 GATT Council discussion preceding the adoption
of the Panel Report, the representative of Thailand "took heart from the report that a set
of GATT-consistent measures could be taken to control the supply of and demand for
cigarettes, as long as they were applied to both domestic and imported cigarettes on a
national-treatment basis." GUIDE TO GAIT, supra note 69, at 525. He announced that
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Many environmentalists have argued that this result set an
almost "impossibly high hurdle" 96 for environmental measures
under Article XX(b). They argued that a less trade-intrusive
policy "is almost always conceivable and therefore in some sense
'available.' 97  Nonetheless, whether the alternative policy is
equally effective in protecting the environment is something that
cannot necessarily be known in advance. In any event, there is no
requirement to consider less GATT-inconsistent alternatives
found within the express terms of Article XX.98 According to one
writer, the Panel's approach ignores "the political difficulty of
adopting optimal environmental policies that serve both trade and
environmental purposes, effectively eviscerating Article
XX[(b)]." 99 Indeed, the restrictive definition of "necessary" does
put a heavy burden on a country seeking to use Article XX(b) to
defend a trade measure. Thai Cigarettes negatively influenced
subsequent environmental litigation, making it difficult to use
Article XX(b) as a shield for environmental measures. Instead,
environmental litigation has revolved around Article XX(g).
100
B. Tuna-Dolphin I
The 1991 Dispute Panel Report in United States-Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna from Mexico (Tuna Dolphin 1)101 served as a
landmark event in the trade and environment debate. Probably
more than any other event prior to the implementation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 10 2 the Panel
Report mobilized environmental NGOs to oppose GATT. To
show their discontent with GATT, environmentalists displayed
posters in Washington, D.C. that depicted a giant lizard named
"GATTzilla" carrying a barrel of DDT and stepping on the U.S.
Capitol building.10 3 Environmentalists objected not only to the
Panel's conclusions, but also to the restrictive way the Panel
Thailand would lift the import ban. See id.
96. ESTY, supra note 3, at 48.
97. Id.
98. See Charnovitz, supra note 63, at 49.
99. ESTY, supra note 3, at 48.
100. See generally id. at 46-50.
101. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GAIT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I].
102. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993).
103. See ESTY, supra note 3, at 35.
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interpreted Article XX.10 4
Tuna-Dolphin I stemmed from violations of provisions of the
1972 U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 10 5 The
MMPA requires fishermen operating in U.S. waters to use certain
techniques to reduce the incidental killing of marine mammals
such as dolphins.10 6 The MMPA also requires that the U.S.
Government ban imports of commercial fish caught with fishing
technology that result in the incidental killing of marine mammals
in excess of U.S. standards. 10 7 In 1988, believing that foreign tuna
fishermen were killing dolphins in violation of the MMPA, an
environmental NGO brought suit to enforce the legislative
mandate. 10 8 A federal judge held that the foreign governments,
one of which was Mexico, had failed to uphold the law and banned
all foreign tuna imports from the United States unless the
Secretary of Commerce found that the foreign nations complied
with the MMPA. 10 9
Mexico argued that its right to sell tuna in the United States
had been violated and requested a GATT Dispute Panel to
adjudicate the matter. 110 The Panel ruled in Mexico's favor.111 It
rejected the United States' argument that the MMPA was
consistent with GATT Article III because it did not treat imported
products less favorably than similar products of national origin.
112
Even though U.S. and foreign fishermen were both required to
reduce the incidental killing of dolphins, the Panel found that
GATT Article III was not applicable to the case because it only
covers regulations affecting products and does not apply to
PPMs. 113 Having decided that Article III did not apply, the Panel
stated:
[T]he MMPA regulates the domestic harvesting of yellowfin
tuna to reduce the incidental taking of dolphin, but these
regulations could not be regarded as being applied to tuna
products as such because they would not directly regulate the
104. See id. at 47.
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1994).
106. See id. § 1371 (a)(2).
107. See id.
108. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
109. See id. at 969.
110. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 101, at 155.
111. See id. at 205.
112. See id. at 195 (discussing GATT art. III, para. 4).
113. See id. at 194.
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sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product.
Therefore.... the import prohibition on certain yellowfin tuna
and certain yellowfin tuna products of Mexico . . . did not
constitute internal regulations covered by... Article 111.114
In other words, the United States was obligated to treat tuna
produced by Mexico no less favorably than tuna produced by the
United States, regardless of how the tuna was harvested. The
Mexican and U.S. tuna were "like" products and required equal
treatment, even though they were caught under different
circumstances. Under Article III, different production methods do
not differentiate products and render them "unlike." The Panel
next considered the United States' arguments that the ban was
justifiable under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g). It rejected the
Article XX(b) argument on the basis that the ban was not
necessary to protect animal life. 115 It stated "[t]he United States
had not demonstrated . . . that it had exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the General
Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international
cooperative arrangements.... "116
The Panel also rejected the argument that Article XX(g)
protected the ban.11 7 Construing the language in Article XX(g)
that conservation measures be taken "in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption,""18 the Panel
concluded that Article XX(g) applied only to measures aimed at
rendering domestic restrictions effective and not to measures
taken jointly with, or otherwise related to, domestic restrictions. 119
It then reasoned:
A country can effectively control the production or
consumption of an exhaustible natural resource only to the
extent that the production or consumption is under its
jurisdiction. This suggests that Article XX(g) was intended to
permit contracting parties to take trade measures primarily
aimed at rendering effective restrictions on production or
114. Id. at 195.
115. See id. at 198-199.
116. Id. at 199.
117. See id. at 201.
118. Id. at 200.
119. See id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
consumption within their jurisdiction.
120
Because the import ban would not help conserve dolphins
found within U.S. jurisdiction, it was not justifiable under Article
XX(g). 121 The clear implication was that Article XX(g) is limited
to measures taken to conserve only domestic natural resources.
Finally, the Panel rejected the notion that a GATT party
could use trade measures to press foreign governments to modify
their policies.122 It thus dismissed the idea that a GATT party
could condition access to its market on its trading partners'
adoption of certain environmental practices. According to the
Panel:
[A] contracting party may not restrict imports of a product
merely because it originates in a country with environmental
policies different from its own .... [I]f the CONTRACTING
PARTIES were to permit import restrictions in response to
differences in environmental policies .. .they would need to
impose limits on the range of policy differences justifying such
responses and to develop criteria so as to prevent abuse. If the
CONTRACTING PARTIES were to decide to permit trade
measures of this type in particular circumstances it would
therefore be preferable for them to do so not by interpreting
Article XX, but by amending or supplementing the provisions
of the General Agreement or waiving obligations
thereunder.
123
The Report was not adopted by the GATT Council. 124 Nor
did Mexico push for its adoption, partly because of the ongoing
NAFTA negotiations. 125  Environmental groups bitterly
denounced the Report. It was perceived as a clear warning that
trade considerations would invariably trump the environmental
protection in GATT.
C. Tuna-Dolphin H
The European community brought its own case, Tuna-
Dolphin H1, against the MMPA, focusing on the law's "secondary
120. Id.
121. See id. at 200-201. See also ESTY, supra note 3, at 268.
122. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 101, at 204.
123. Id.
124. See ESTY, supra note 3, at 269.
125. See id.
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embargo." 126 This provision barred tuna imports to the United
States from countries engaging in tuna trade with an embargoed
country such as Mexico. 127 Several European countries imported
tuna from Mexico. The European Community argued that the
secondary embargo was not covered by Article III, violated
Article XI, and could not be justified under Article XX.
128
In June 1994, the Panel ruled that the secondary embargo
violated GAT-. 129 Unlike the Panel in Tuna-Dolphin I, the Tuna-
Dolphin H Panel concluded that Articles XX(b) and XX(g) could
be applied extraterritorially, because "[i]t could not ... be said
that the General Agreement proscribed in an absolute manner
measures that related to things or actions outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the party taking the measure." 130  The Panel,
however, found measures that force other countries to effectively
change their policies with respect to persons or things within their
own jurisdictions were not covered by Articles XX(b) and (g) in
that:
If... Article XX was interpreted to permit contracting parties
to take trade measures so as to force other contracting parties
to change their policies within their jurisdiction, including their
conservation policies, the balance of rights and obligations
among contracting parties, in particular the right of access to
markets, would be seriously impaired. Under such an
interpretation the General Agreement could no longer serve as
multilateral framework for trade among contracting parties1 31
It was clear the embargo was designed to force policy changes
in third countries, such as Mexico, because the secondary embargo
prohibited imports of tuna regardless of whether the tuna was
harvested in a manner harming dolphins, or whether tuna fishing
practices in the exporting country as a whole harmed dolphins. 132
Therefore, the secondary embargo was not justifiable under
Article XX. 13 3 The Report was not, however, adopted by the
126. Id.
127. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Import of Tuna, June
16, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II].
128. See id. at 851.
129. See id. at 899.
130. Id. at 891.
131. Id. at 894.
132. See id. at 897.
133. See id. at 898.
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GATT' Council.
D. Reformulated Gas
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (Reformulated Gas)134 was the first environmental case
decided after the establishment of the WTO. It involved a
provision of the Clean Air Act 135 that required oil refiners to
reduce a variety of smog-causing contaminants in their gasoline
from a baseline determined by the composition of the gasoline in
1990.136 In 1993, the Environmental Protection Administration
(EPA) issued regulations permitting most domestic refiners to
establish their baseline using their own actual data from 1990.137
Most foreign refiners were required to use the U.S. industry's
average level of contaminants in 1990 as their baseline. 138 The
rule for importers stemmed from the EPA's conclusion that
requirements applied to U.S. refiners could not be applied to
foreign refiners without raising substantial concerns regarding the
availability of foreign data and enforcement methods.139
Venezuela and Brazil challenged the regulation arguing that it
discriminated against foreign gasoline. 140 In 1996, a WTO Dispute
Panel found that the regulation violated Article III. 141 The Panel
concluded that the inability of foreign refiners to use individual
baselines meant that imported gasoline was treated less favorably
than domestic gasoline (a "like" product). 142 The Panel also
rejected the argument that the regulation was "necessary" within
the meaning of Article XX(b).143
134. See World Trade Organization: Report of the Panel in United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like
Products of National Origin, Jan. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996). [hereinafter Dispute Panel
Report II]; see also World Trade Organization Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate
Body in United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May, 20,
1996, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report II].
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
136. See id. § 7545(k)(1).
137. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(a)(i) (1994).
138. See id.
139. See generally Dispute Panel Report II, supra note 134, at 296.
140. See id. at 293.
141. See id. at 295.
142. See id. The Panel noted that the term "like" can mean "similar" or "identical."
Id.
143. See id. at 298. The Panel proceeded to examine whether there were measures
consistent or less inconsistent with the General Agreement that were reasonably available
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The Panel then considered whether the discrimination was
justified under Article XX(g). It rejected the argument of
Venezuela and Brazil that clean air is not a "natural resource."'
144
It concluded, however, that in the absence of a "direct connection"
between the less favorable treatment of foreign gasoline and the
air quality goals of the United States, the regulation was not
"primarily aimed" at the conservation of a natural resource. 145
The regulation therefore failed the "relating to" condition of
Article XX(g).
On appeal, the U.S. Government contended that the
regulation met the requirements of Article XX(g), and the
Appellate Body agreed. It rejected the finding that the regulation
was not "primarily aimed at," and thus not "related to," the
conservation of clean air. 146 According to the Appellate Body, the
Panel seemed to equate "related to" with "necessary," which was
incorrect under the "fundamental" rule of treaty interpretation.
147
The Appellate Body also found the regulation was "made effective
in conjunction with" domestic conservation measures.148 This
result was reached because restrictions on domestic production
had been "established jointly" with restrictions on foreign
gasoline.149 Under these circumstances the regulation satisfied
Article XX(g).
to the United States to further its policy objectives of protecting human, animal and plant
life or health. See id. at 296. "In the view of the Panel, baseline establishment methods
could be applied to entities dealing in imported gasoline in a way that granted treatment
to imported gasoline that was consistent or less inconsistent with the General
Agreement." Id. at 299-300.
144. Id. at 299. In the Panel's view, clean air was a resource because it had value, it
was natural, and it could be depleted; the fact that a resource was renewable could not be
an objection. See id.
145. See i. at 300.
The Panel then considered whether the precise aspects of the Gasoline Rule that
it had found to violate Article Ill-the less favourable baseline establishments
methods that adversely affected the conditions of competition for imported
gasoline-were primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources. The
Panel saw no direct connection between less favorable treatment of imported
gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline, and the U.S.
objective of improving air quality in the United States.
Id.
146. Appellate Body Report II, supra note 134, at 623.
147. Id. at 618.
148. Id. at 624.
149. See generally id. at 623-626.
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For a measure to be upheld under Article XX, however, it
must do more than simply satisfy one of the particular exceptions
that are listed in paragraphs (b) and (g).150 It must also satisfy the
general conditions found in the chapeau. 151 According to the
Appellate Body, the chapeau does not address the content of the
measure at issue, but rather, the manner in which the measure is
applied: 15
2
[T]he purpose or object of the introductory clauses of Article
XX is generally the prevention of abuse of the exceptions ....
The chapeau is animated by the principle that.., the exceptions
of Article XX, . . . should not be so applied as to frustrate or
defeat the legal obligations ... under the substantive rules of
the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be
abused or misused.., the measures falling within the particular
exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to
the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal
rights of the other parties concerned.
153
Moreover, the party invoking the exception has the burden of
demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified under one of
the specific exceptions also meets the requirements of the
chapeau. 154 Meeting this burden "is, of necessity, a heavier task
than that involved in showing that an exception, such as Article
XX(g), encompasses the measure at issue."1 55
The chapeau also requires that a measure taken pursuant to
one of the specific paragraphs does not constitute "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination," 156 or a "disguised restriction on
international trade." 157 Although the Appellate Body wrestled
with these phrases, it did not provide a clear definition. Perhaps
the clearest and most comprehensive analysis it offered was:
'Arbitrary discrimination,' 'unjustifiable discrimination' and
'disguised restriction' on international trade may ... be read
side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It is clear to
us that 'disguised restriction' includes disguised discrimination
150. See id. at 623.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 626.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 626-627.
155. Id. at 627.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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We consider that 'disguised restriction,' whatever else it
covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions
amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
[T]he kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the
application of a particular measure amounts to 'arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination,' may also be taken into account in
determining the presence of a 'disguised restriction' on
international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in
the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of
the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.
15 8
It is questionable whether this explanation added much clarity
to the language already in the chapeau. It served, however, as the
basis for finding the EPA regulation defective. The Appellate
Body cited two distinct shortcomings in the regulation. First, the
EPA had not adequately explored means of mitigating the
verification and enforcement problems associated with individual
baselines for foreign refiners. 159 In particular, "the United States
had not pursued the possibility of entering into cooperative
arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and
Brazil. .. 160 in order to gather and verify information on gasoline
refiners, and thus permit the use of individual company baselines
in those countries. 161 In this regard, the Appellate Body noted
that foreign company data is routinely used in anti-dumping
investigations. It also noted that the United States had entered
into numerous agreements with other countries to share
information in antitrust, tax, securities, and other cases.162 The
regulation's second shortcoming was that the EPA had considered
the costs of various regulatory options available to domestic
refiners, but not to foreign refiners. 163 Because of these defects,
the Appellate Body concluded that the gasoline regulation
constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and was in reality a
"disguised restriction on international trade."'164 As a result, the
regulation failed to satisfy Article XX. 165
158. Id. at 629.
159. See id. at 631.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 621 & n.52.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 633.
165. See id.
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The litigation of the 1990s did much to shape and provide
content to the environmental provisions of Article XX. The
emerging legal picture, however, was not particularly hospitable to
the goal of environmental protection.
A restrictive interpretation of the "life or health" exception in
paragraph (b) was adopted. The notion that PPMs could
distinguish between products for the purposes of Article III was
rejected.166 Additionally, serious restrictions were placed on the
extraterritorial application of environmental measures.
Discriminatory measures designed to simplify environmental
enforcement might be unjustified if alternative diplomatic
solutions are not first explored. 167
As a result, many environmentalists in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere worried that adequate protection of the
environment was not possible within the existing framework of the
WTO. Environmentalists were often drawn into trade politics
where they tended to side with critics of globalization in order to
achieve their goal of environmental protection. Shrimp-Turtle
took place within this polarized atmosphere and was watched with
great interest by environmentalists everywhere.
V. SHRIMP-TURTLE: THE DIsPuTE PANEL REPORT
The facts in Shrimp-Turtle168 were similar to those in Tuna-
Dolphin I and H earlier in the decade. The case originated from
the United States' efforts to protect the world's imperiled sea
turtle population. Most sea turtles live in tropical or sub-tropical
seas. 169 They are "exploited for their meat, shell[s,] and eggs."'170
They are also affected by ocean pollution, habitat destruction, and
"incidental capture by fisheries."' 171 All species of sea turtles are
listed as threatened with extinction in CITES.172
166. See id. at 632.
167. See id. at 620 (noting that the measures "had not been shown by the United States
to be 'necessary' under Article XX(b) since alternative measures either consistent or less
inconsistent with the General Agreement were reasonably available to the United States
for achieving its aim of protecting human, animal or plant life.").
168. See generally Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5; see also generally Dispute
Panel Report I, supra note 5.
169. See Dispute Panel Report I, supra note 5, at 837.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 855.
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"[I]ncidental capture and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp
trawlers is a significant source of mortality for sea turtles." 173 To
counteract this threat, the U.S. Government issued regulations
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.174 These regulations
require shrimp fishermen operating in U.S. waters to install turtle
excluder devices (TEDs) in their trawling nets when fishing in
areas of significant sea turtle population. 175 A TED allows shrimp
to pass to the back of the net while sea turtles and other large
objects are directed out of the net.
176
In 1989, the U.S. Government enacted Section 609 of Public
Law 101-162,177 which called upon the U.S. Government to
negotiate bilateral and multilateral treaties for the protection of
sea turtles. 178 Section 609 also prohibits the import of shrimp
harvested with technology dangerous to sea turtles, unless the
President annually certifies that:
(A) the government of the harvesting nation has provided
documentary evidence of the adoption of a program governing
the incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of such
harvesting that is comparable to that of the United States; and
(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by vessels of the
harvesting nation is comparable to the average rate of
incidental taking of sea turtles by United States vessels in the
course of such harvesting .... 17 9
173. Id. at 837.
174. See id. (referring to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994)).
175. See Sea Turtle Conservation, Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24244
(1987).
176. See Dispute Panel Report I, supra note 5, at 837 n.613.
177. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (1989)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994)).
178. The United States negotiated one regional international agreement for the
protection and conservation of sea turtles: The Inter-American Convention for the
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. See Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5,
at 170. This was opened for signing on December 1, 1996, and has been signed, in addition
to the United States, by four Latin American countries; but it has not yet been ratified by
any of the signatories. See id. The Convention commits parties to take measures to
conserve sea turtles, including the reduction of incidental killing of turtles in the course of
fishing operations through the use of TEDs and other appropriate technology. See id.
179. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 562 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
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The United States issued guidelines in 1991180 and 1993181 to
implement Section 609. Pursuant to these guidelines, Section 609
applied only to countries in the Caribbean and the Western
Atlantic. 182 In December 1995, the U.S. Court of International
Trade (CIT) found that the guidelines were illegal insofar as they
limited the geographic scope of Section 609.183 The CIT directed
the U.S. Government to prohibit, no later than May 1, 1996, the
importation of shrimp harvested anywhere in the world where
commercial fishing technology with the potential to adversely
affect sea turtles was used.
184
In April 1996, the U.S. Government issued new regulations in
compliance with the CIT's order.185  "The new guidelines
extended the scope of Section 609 to shrimp harvested in all
countries." 186 As of May 1, 1996, all shrimp imported into the
United States must be accompanied by a Shrimp Exporter's
Declaration Form.187 This form must attest either that the shrimp
was harvested under conditions that do not adversely affect sea
turtles,188 or that that shrimp was harvested in waters subject to
180. See generally Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations Protection Guidelines,
56 Fed. Reg. 1051 (1991).
181. See generally Revised Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign
Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed. Reg.
9015 (1993).
182. See Dispute Panel Report I, supra note 5, at 837.
183. See Earth Island Inst., 913 F. Supp. at 573-576.
184. See id. at 562.
185. See generally Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of
Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61
Fed. Reg. 17342 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Guidelines].
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. The regulations define "shrimp or shrimp products harvested in conditions that
do not adversely affect sea turtles" to include:
(a) shrimp harvested in an aquaculture facility... ; (b) shrimp harvested by
commercial shrimp trawl vessels using TEDs comparable in effectiveness to
those required in the United States; (c) shrimp harvested exclusively by means
that do not involve the retrieval of fishing nets by mechanical devices or by
vessels using gear that, in accordance with the U.S. program, would require
TEDs; (d) species of shrimp ... harvested in areas in which sea turtles do not
occur.
61 Fed. Reg. at 17343. On October 8, 1996, the Court of International Trade ruled that
the 1996 Guidelines were in violation of Section 609 by allowing the importation of shrimp
from non-certified countries where the import was accompanied by a Shrimp Exporter's
Declaration Form. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597, 605 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1996), vacated, Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(vacating the decision of the Court of International Trade on procedural grounds). See
1999] The Shrimp- Turtle Case: Implications for GA TT 31
the jurisdiction of a nation currently certified pursuant to Section
609.189 The regulations provided that certification could be
granted annually to harvesting countries that provide documentary
evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program designed to
reduce the incidental killing of sea turtles. 190 These programs
require standards comparable to the United States' standards and
an average rate of incidental killing comparable to that of U.S.
vessels. 191 Countries shall be certified if their programs include: (i)
a requirement that their fishermen use TEDs that are "comparable
in effectiveness to those used in the United States. Any exceptions
to this requirement must be comparable to those of the United
States program ... ;"192 and (ii) "a credible enforcement effort
that includes monitoring for compliance and appropriate
sanctions." 193 The average incidental killing rate "will be deemed
comparable if the harvesting nation requires the use of TEDs in a
manner comparable to that of the U.S. program ... ."194 In other
words, most, if not all, countries that wish to export shrimp to the
United States are required to adopt TED programs similar to that
imposed by the United States.
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand challenged this
amended regulation. 195 These countries charged that the import
prohibition was a violation of GATT Article XI.19 6  As noted
earlier, Article XI provides that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party .... "197
In its April 1998 Report, the WTO Dispute Panel agreed with
the complaining countries, and noted that "Section 609 expressly
also CIT Strikes Blow at U.S. Compliance with WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 16, 1999, at 1, 3. In practice, few exemptions from the import ban were
available for non-certified countries during the course of the Panel dispute.
189. See 1996 Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17343.
190. See Dispute Panel Report I, supra note 5, at 838.
191. See 1996 Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17343.
192. Id. at 17344.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Dispute Panel Report I, supra note 5, at 839.
196. See id. (regarding claims of violations of GATT art. XI, para. 1).
197. GATT art. XI, para. 1.
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requires the imposition of an import ban on imports from non-
certified countries .... In other words, the United States bans
imports of shrimp or shrimp products from any country not
meeting certain policy conditions.' 198 This was deemed a violation
of Article XI.199 Under the circumstances, the Panel did not find it
necessary to examine other arguments that the United States also
violated Article III and Article I by discriminating against "like"
products from other countries.
200
The Panel then turned to the United States' argument that
the ban was justified under Article XX (b) and (g). 201 It never
considered, however, the requirements of those specific
paragraphs. Instead, it noted that:
Article XX contains an introductory provision, or chapeau, and
a number of specific requirements contained in successive
paragraphs.... [P]anels have in the past considered the specific
paragraphs of Article XX before reviewing the applicability of
the conditions contained in the chapeau. However, as the
conditions contained in the introductory provision apply to any
of the paragraphs of Article XX, it seems equally appropriate to
analyse [sic] first the introductory provision of Article XX.
202
Thus, without first considering whether the import ban met
the conditions of paragraphs (b) or (g), the Panel proceeded
immediately to consider whether the ban constituted "unjustifiable
discrimination." The Panel recognized that this phrase was
problematic, because "[t]he word 'unjustifiable' has never actually
been subject to any precise interpretation, ... "203 and that "[t]he
ordinary meaning of this term is susceptible to both narrow and
broad interpretations. '" 20 4 The Panel therefore reasoned that "it is
essential that we interpret the term 'unjustifiable' within its
context and in the light of the object and purpose of the agreement
to which it belongs." 20 5  According to the Panel, the central
purpose of the WTO Agreement is to promote economic
198. Dispute Panel Report I, supra note 5, at 841.
199. See id. at 839.
200. The complaining countries argued that foreign and U.S. shrimp are "like
products" in the sense that they have the same physical characteristics, end-uses, and tariff
classifications, and are perfectly substitutable. See id. at 841.
201. See id. at 843.
202. Id. at 844.
203. Id. at 846.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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development through trade, not protect the environment.
20 6 It
stated that "[w]hile the WTO Preamble confirms that
environmental considerations are important for the interpretation
of the WTO Agreement, the central focus of that agreement
remains the promotion of economic development through liberal
trade; and the provisions of GATF are essentially turned toward
liberalization of access to markets on a nondiscriminatory
basis. "207
Moreover, the Panel stated that "the WTO Agreement
favours a multilateral approach to trade issues . "..."208 In the
Panel's view, the WTO system strongly disfavors unilateral
measures by WTO Members. Instead, it favors negotiation among
its WTO Members concerning their multi-lateral trade relations.
20 9
Given this analysis of the purpose behind the WTO
Agreement, the Panel concluded that Article XX allowed WTO
Members to derogate from their GAT-T obligations only if they
did so without undermining the WTO multilateral trading
system.210 Any measure that undermines the system constitutes an
abuse of that system and is in violation of Article XX.211 From
there, the Panel concluded that the U.S. import ban was
unjustifiable under Article XX.212 It stated that:
[I]f an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be
followed which would allow a Member to adopt measures
conditioning access to its market for a given product upon the
adoption by the exporting Members of certain policies,
including conservation policies, GAT[ . . .and the WTO
Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework
for trade among Members as security and predictability of trade
relations under those agreements would be threatened.... [I]f
one WTO Member were allowed to adopt such measures, then
other Members would also have the right to adopt similar
measures on the same subject but with differing, or even
conflicting, requirements. . . . []t would be impossible for
exporting Members to comply at the same time with multiple
206. See id. at 848.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 849-850.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 856.
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conflicting policy requirements.
213
As the Panel cautioned, this result could create chaos because
"[m]arket access for goods could become subject to an increasing
number of conflicting policy requirements for the same product
and this would rapidly lead to the end of the WTO multilateral
trading system." 214  Because U.S. measures posed this type of
threat to the WTO system, they constituted unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevailed.215 Thus, the measures were not permitted under Article
XX.
21 6
VI. SHRIMP-TURTLE: APPELLATE BODY REPORT
The United States appealed the case to the WTO Appellate
Body, which issued an opinion in October of 1998.217 Surprisingly,
the Appellate Body rejected the Dispute Panel's approach to
Article XX and identified several serious errors in the Panel's
reasoning.
First, the Appellate Body noted that the Panel misconstrued
the ordinary meaning of the words in Article XX by focusing on
the content or design of the import ban.218 "The introductory
clauses of Article XX," the Appellate Body noted, "speak of the
'manner' in which measures sought to be justified are 'applied.' ' 219
This means that an Article XX analysis should focus on the way a
trade measure is applied, not on the content of the measure
itself.220 The Panel had failed in this respect:
The Panel did not inquire specifically into how the application
of Section 609 constitutes 'a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.' What
the Panel did, in purporting to examine the consistency of the
measure with the chapeau of Article XX, was to focus
repeatedly on the design of the measure itself. For instance, the
Panel stressed that it was addressing 'a particular situation
213. Id. at 849.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 856.
216. See id.
217. See Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5.
218. See generally id. at 150.
219. Id.
220. See id.
[Vol. 22:1
1999] The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for GATT 35
where a Member has taken unilateral measures which, by their
nature, could put the multilateral trading system at risk.
221
The failure to appreciate this distinction meant that the Panel
erred from the outset of its analysis.
The Panel's second error was that it misconstrued the
ordinary meaning of Article XX by interpreting the words in light
of the object and purpose of the entire WTO Agreement, rather
than in terms of the object and purpose of the Article XX
chapeau.222 According to the Appellate Body, reading Article XX
in such a broad context was a serious flaw.223 It stated:
Maintaining, rather than undermining, the multilateral trading
system is necessarily a fundamental and pervasive premise
underlying the WTO Agreement; but it is not a right or an
obligation, nor is it an interpretive rule which can be employed
in the appraisal of a given measure under the chapeau of ArticleXX.2 2 4
The purpose of the chapeau, the Appellate Body wrote, is to
prevent abuse of the exceptions under Article XX.225 However,
"the [P]anel did not attempt to inquire into how the measure at
stake was being applied in such a manner as to constitute abuse or
misuse of a given kind of exception."
226
According to the Appellate Body, both of these errors flowed
naturally from the third and most serious defect in the Panel's
analysis.227 Namely, the Panel's decision to evaluate Section 609
in terms of the standards in the chapeau prior to a determination
that the import ban satisfied any of Article XX's specific
exceptions. 228  The Appellate Body criticized the Panel for
ignoring the method enunciated in Reformulated Gas,229 which
was the reverse of the method used by the Panel. It stated that
"[t]he task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse
or misuse of the specific exemptions ... is rendered very difficult,
if indeed it remains possible at all, where the interpreter (like the
221. Id. at 150-151.
222. See id. at 151.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Appellate Body Report II, supra note 134.
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Panel in this case) has not first identified and examined the specific
exception threatened with abuse." 230 This is because the standards
in the chapeau only take on specific meaning in the context of a
particular case:
When applied in a particular case, the actual contours and
contents of these standards vary as the kind of measure under
examination varies. What is appropriately characterizable as
'arbitrary discrimination' or 'unjustifiable discrimination,' or as
a 'disguised restriction on international trade' in respect of one
category of measures, need not be so with respect to another
group or type of measures. The standard of 'arbitrary
discrimination,' for example, under the chapeau may be
different for a measure that purports to be necessary to protect
public morals than for one relating to the products of prison
labour.231
By focusing on the chapeau, the Dispute Panel reached the
conclusion that Section 609 fell within a class of illegal measures
under GATT because it conditioned access to the U.S. domestic
market on the adoption of conservation measures prescribed by
the U.S. Government. 232 This missed the point, however, of
Article XX. Article XX carves out exceptions to the substantive
obligations in GATT precisely because the policies embodied in
the exceptions are legitimate and important. 233 Therefore, there is
no reason to assume the needs of the multilateral trading system
will always trump these domestic policies:
It appears to us . . . that conditioning access to a Member's
domestic market on whether exporting Members comply with,
or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the
importing Member may ... be a common aspect of measures
falling within the scope of [Article XX] .... It is not necessary
to assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance
with, or adoption of, certain policies . . . prescribed by the
importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable of
justification under Article XX. Such an interpretation renders
most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile,
a result abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are
230. Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 152.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. See generally GATr art. XX.
[Vol. 22:1
1999] The Shrimp- Turtle Case: Implications for GATT 37
bound to apply.
234
Having rejected the Panel's root-and-branch approach, the
Appellate Body was compelled to carry out its own analysis to
determine whether Section 609 complied with Article XX. The
first step was to determine whether Section 609 is provisionally
justifiable under a particular Article XX exception. The Appellate
Body found it could do so under Article XX(g).235 Its discussion
of Article XX(g) not only clarified the language therein, but also
interpreted the paragraph in an extremely environment-friendly
fashion.
As noted above, Article XX(g) covers.measures "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption .... "236 Article XX(g) is not limited
to the conservation of mineral or non-living natural resources.
The Appellate Body wrote, "[w]e do not believe that 'exhaustible'
natural resources and 'renewable' natural resources are mutually
exclusive. ... Living resources are just as 'finite' as petroleum,
iron ore and other non-living resources."
237
Interestingly, this conclusion was not based on an analysis of
the paragraph's negotiating history, or a careful exegesis of its
language in the context of Article XX. Instead, the Appellate
Body invoked evolving international norms:
The words of Article XX(g), 'exhaustible natural resources,'
were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be
read by a treaty interpreter in light of contemporary concerns of
the community of nations about the protection and
conservation of the environment . . . [T]he generic term
'natural resources' in Article XX(g) is not 'static' in its content
or reference but is rather 'by definition, evolutionary.'
238
The Appellate Body emphasized the objective of "sustainable
development" as explicitly acknowledged in the Preamble to the
234. Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 152-153.
235. See id.
236. GAT! art. XX.
237. Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 154.
238. Id at 154-155 (stating that where concepts embodied in a treaty are "by
definition, evolutionary," their "interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the
subsequent development of law." (citation omitted)). The Appellate Body, however, did
not offer an explanation as to why the phrase "natural resources" is, by definition,
evolutionary. See id.
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WTO Agreement. 239 It also stressed that the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 240 treats "natural resources" as
including both living and non-living resources. 241 Additionally, the
Appellate Body cited two earlier GATT 1947 Dispute Panel
Reports that treated fish as an "exhaustible natural resource."
242
Section 609 is also deemed a measure "relating to" the
conservation of a natural resource.243 In the Appellate Body's
view, Section 609 is directly connected to the goal of conserving
sea turtles.244 It stated that:
[The U.S. measure] is not disproportionately wide in its scope
and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and
conservation of sea turtle species. The means are, in principle,
reasonably related to the ends. The means and ends
relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of
conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is
observably a close and real one.
245
Given this close fit, Section 609 satisfied the "relating to"
condition in Article XX(g).
246
Finally, the Appellate Body found that Section 609 is -a
measure made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption. 247 The concept of "even-
handedness" was central to the Appellate Body's brief discussion
of this issue. 248 Because the restrictions imposed by Section 609
regarding imported shrimp were also imposed on shrimp caught by
U.S. vessels, the law was "even-handed," and thus, passed
muster.
24 9
In short, Section 609 and the accompanying regulations were
found to come within the terms of Article XX(g). Having reached
that conclusion, however, the Appellate Body turned to the second
stage of the Article XX analysis. It examined the challenged
239. See Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 156.
240. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122,
art. 56, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1261, 1280.
241. See Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 156.
242. Id. at 155.
243. See id. at 156.
244. See id. at 159.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 159-160.
248. See id. at 159.
249. See id. at 160.
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measure in light of the standards in the chapeau. The Appellate
Body began by dismissing a contention put forth by the United
States that any bona fide, non-protectionist measure falling within
a particular Article XX exception was, by definition, non-abusive
and therefore legitimate.250 As the Appellate Body pointed out,
this argument would read the chapeau out of Article XX.251 The
opinion then proceeded to the heart of the Article XX analysis.
Taking up the issue of whether Section 609 and the
regulations constituted "unjustifiable discrimination," the
Appellate Body noted that the statutory provisions in Section 609
did not require other WTO Members to adopt the same policies
and enforcement practices as those of the United States.
252
Harvesting nations were simply required to have programs
"comparable" to the U.S. program, and reduce their incidental
kills to the average rate attained in the United States.253 As the
opinion noted:
Viewed alone, the statute appears to permit a degree of
discretion or flexibility in how the standards for determining
comparability might be applied, in practice, to other countries.
However, any flexibility that may have been intended by
Congress when it enacted the statutory provision has been
effectively eliminated in the implementation of that policy
through the 1996 Guidelines promulgated by the Department of
State and through the practice of the administrators in making
certification determinations.
254
The problem with the guidelines, however, was that they
required harvesting nations to mandate the use of TEDs
comparable in effectiveness to those used in the United States.
Effectively, other WTO Members had to adopt turtle conservation
programs that were not merely comparable to, but rather
essentially the same as, the program applied in the United States.
This offended the Appellate Body in that:
[T]he effect of the application of Section 609 is to establish a
rigid and unbending standard by which United States officials
determine whether or not countries will be certified, thus
granting or refusing other countries the right to export shrimp
250. See id. at 161.
251. See id. at 156.
252. See id. at 159.
253. See id. at 158.
254. Id. at 167.
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to the United States. Other specific policies and measures that
an exporting country may have adopted for the protection and
conservation of sea turtles are not taken into account, in
practice, by the administrators making the comparability
determination.25
5
Moreover, the Appellate Body found the use of an embargo
unacceptable in international trade relations.256 An embargo
would force WTO Members to adopt essentially the same
regulatory program as the United States, without consideration of
the different conditions that may occur in their territories. 257
Furthermore, the Appellate Body found it unjustifiable for
the United States to ban imports on shrimp caught by fishermen
who had used TEDs but had fished in the waters of uncertified
countries.258 The Appellate Body viewed this ban on shrimp as
"difficult to reconcile with the declared policy objective of
protecting and conserving sea turtles," 259 because sea turtles had
not been put in jeopardy. They suggested that "this measure, in its
application, is more concerned with effectively influencing WTO
Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory
regime as that applied by the United States ... even though many
of those Members may be differently situated. ' '260
According to the Appellate Body, unjustifiable discrimination
results whenever the application of a measure does not allow any
inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the
conditions prevailing in exporting countries. 261 Equally serious
and unjustifiable was "the failure of the United States to engage
the appellees ... in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the
objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the
protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the
import prohibition ....262 The Appellate Body acknowledged
the efforts of the U.S. Government to negotiate for the
preservation of sea turtles at the Inter-American Convention, but
held these efforts were nevertheless unfair:
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 168.
259. Id. at 165.
260. Id. at 167.
261. See id.
262. Id.
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The Inter-American Convention . . . provides convincing
demonstration that an alternative course of action was
reasonably open to the United States for securing the legitimate
policy goal of its measure, a course of action other than the
unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import
prohibition under Section 609 .... Clearly, the United States
negotiated seriously with some, but not with other Members
(including the appellees), that export shrimp to the United
States. The effect is plainly discriminatory and
unjustifiable.
263
The unilateral application of Section 609 against the appellees
"heighten[ed] the disruptive and discriminatory influence of the
import prohibition and underscore[d] its unjustifiability."
264
Finally, the Appellate Body was concerned about the
discriminatory application of Section 609. Countries in the
Caribbean and Western Atlantic had three years to implement the
use of TEDs, while India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand had
only four months.265 Because the length of the phase-in period
was not inconsequential for countries seeking certification, the
United States' failure to ensure equal treatment was deemed
unjustifiable discrimination.
266
The Appellate Body found ample evidence that Section 609
and the corresponding guidelines arbitrarily discriminated against
the appellee countries. 267 It regarded the certification process as
so unclear and unpredictable that the appellees had been denied
basic due process.2 68 The procedural defects were itemized as
follows:
The certification processes . . . consist principally of
administrative ex parte inquiry or verification by [U.S.
Government] staff .... [T]here is no formal opportunity for an
applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any arguments
263. Id. at 171.
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. See id. The Appellate Body understood that the ban had been applied to India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand only as a result of an order from the Court of
International Trade. See id. The U.S. Government was given very little time to negotiate
agreements. See id Exporting countries were also given very little time to phase-in
TEDs. See id. The Appellate Body wrote, however, that "[t]he United States, like all
other Members of the WTO ... bears responsibility for acts of all its departments of
government, including its judiciary." Id. at 171-172.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 173.
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that may be made against it, in the course of the certification
process .... [N]o formal written, reasoned decision, whether of
acceptance or rejection, is rendered on applications for . ..
certification .... Countries whose applications are denied...
do not receive notice of such denial... or of the reasons for the
denial. No procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of
an application is provided.
269
To the Appellate Body, the certification process was
"singularly informal and casual." 270  It fell far short of the
"rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due
process" 271 that should be required "in the application and
administration of a measure which purports to be an exception to
the treaty obligations . "..272 of a WTO Member.273 Under the
circumstances, the measure was groundless, arbitrary
discrimination 274 not justified under Article XX.
VII. SHRIMP-TURTLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT DEBATE
The Appellate Body's decision was met with both relief and
disappointment by environmentalists. Although they were
relieved that the extreme positions taken by the Dispute Panel
were rejected, they were disappointed that yet another
environmental protection law was not fully protected by Article
XX. They questioned whether any law could sustain a WTO
challenge. Section 609 and the guidelines failed even though they
were designed to achieve an important environmental goal,
imposed burdens on both domestic and foreign interests, and
lacked a protectionist motive.
275
Shortly after the Appellate Body issued its opinion, the
National Wildlife Federation (NVF) announced that it was
"seriously concerned" about the impact of the WTO case. 276 It
269. Id.
270. Id. at 174.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See id. Having concluded that Section 609 and the guidelines constituted arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination, the Appellate Body saw no need to determine whether
they were also a disguised restriction on international trade. See id. at 139.
275. See generally U.S. Loses Appeal on Saving Sea Turtles, J. COMM., Oct. 14, 1990, at
1A.
276. See National Wildlife Federation, Breaking News: WTO Appellate Body Strikes
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stated:
Since the Appellate body found that the language of the law
itself falls within the boundaries of the exceptions allowed to
trade rules, they have opened the door for a country to take
strong measures to protect shared global resources such as sea
turtles. Yet, with their analysis of the implementation of the
law, the WTO has also established a stringent requirement that
countries implement a conservation law perfectly in order for it
to be allowed by the WTO.
2 77
The NWF was most concerned about the difficulties the
opinion might cause for future attempts to protect the
environment through the use of trade measures. It wrote:
[S]ometimes it is impossible to negotiate with all countries when
trying to protect a species on the verge of extinction.
Sometimes timing or political situations necessitate that one
country take the lead in promoting comprehensive
environmental protections. Although they did it imperfectly,
the U.S. [G]overnment made a good faith effort to protect
endangered sea turtles around the world from death in shrimp
nets. While efforts by one country are not enough, and are not
the ideal solution to international environmental problems,
sometimes, in cases such as this one where an entire life form is
threatened, they are necessary.
278
The NWF called on the U.S. Government to engage in
negotiations with other countries to protect sea turtles, but also
continue enforcement and not weaken the law, despite pressure
from the WTO.
279
It is clear that as a result of the Appellate Body's opinion,
saving sea turtles from destruction is now a more complicated
undertaking for both the United States and other countries.
Nevertheless, while the opinion fell short of what
environmentalists hoped for, the Shrimp-Turtle decision made a
number of important and positive contributions to WTO
Down U.S. Turtle Protection for the Last Time (visited Aug. 24, 1999)
<http://www.nwf.org/nwf/international/trade/turtles/wtofinal.html>.
277. hi
278. Id.
279. See id. Other NGOs were even bleaker. David Schorr, Director of the World
Wildlife Fund's Sustainable Commerce Unit, was quoted as saying that the Shrimp-Turtle
decision proved that the WTO is "simply not competent to decide issues that require a
mature balance between liberalized trade and other legitimate policy goals." U.S. Loses
Appeal on Saving Sea Turtles, supra note 275, at IA.
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jurisprudence.
The Appellate Body's decision served to clarify the meaning
of some of the terms in Article XX(g). First, the Appellate Body
interpreted Article XX through the lens of the WTO's Preamble,
which explicitly acknowledges "the objective of sustainable
development" and the importance of protecting and preserving the
environment.280  This approach led the Appellate Body to
conclude that Article XX is "not static in its content or reference
but is rather by definition, evolutionary. "281 This was a significant
step toward ensuring that GATT is interpreted consistently with
evolving principles of international environmental law. In
addition, the decision clarified that the chapeau regulates how a
measure is applied, but does not impose additional substantive
standards, such as the Dispute Panel's undermining of the WTO
test.282 This works to remove one obstacle in the use of trade
measures for the protection of the environment.
One of the Appellate Body's central findings was the
conclusion that sea turtles and other living creatures fall within the
meaning of the term "exhaustible natural resources" in Article
XX(g). The Appellate Body's rejection of the notion that the term
applies only to non-renewable resources, such as oil or minerals,
combined with the finding in Reformulated Gas that clean air is
also an exhaustible natural resource, should end arguments to use
narrow interpretation of Article XX(g). 283 The way is clear for
Article XX(g) to be used to protect broad environmental interests.
Another key result was the Appellate Body's strong
endorsement of negotiated agreements as the preferred means of
solving environmental problems. This finding makes it unlikely
that future Panels will overturn measures taken pursuant to
MEAs, at least in any disputes between two parties. It is
questionable, however, how a Panel would view a measure taken
pursuant to an MEA, but against a non-party. The Panel might
treat the MEA as evidence of an international standard and render
the trade measure justifiable and non-arbitrary within the meaning
of Article XX. It might reject the measure as unjustifiable,
however, unless the importing nation made serious efforts to
280. Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 155.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 151.
283. See generally id. at 154-155.
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encourage the non-party to join the MEA prior to the imposition
of the measure. This question remains unanswered.
The Appellate Body's finding that the content of Section 609
satisfies Article XX(g) was also very important. It implicitly
rejected the conclusion of Tuna-Dolphin 11, which states that trade
measures are not justified under Article XX if they seek to
encourage other countries to change their environmental policies.
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body's language on this issue is very
carefully hedged. It wrote, "[i]t is not necessary to assume that
requiring from exporting countries compliance with, or adoption
of, certain policies ... renders a measure a priori incapable of
justification ... ."284 Whether this will provide effective guidance
to Panels dealing with similar, but not identical, circumstances is
unclear, but this certainly leaves room for future litigation. The
only thing ruled out is an assumption that a measure designed with
this intent is unjustified.
Similarly, the Appellate Body implicitly rejected the
conclusion in Tuna-Dolphin I, that Article XX(g) is limited to
measures that conserve resources within the jurisdiction of the
party taking such measures, because sea turtles in the Indian
Ocean are not within the jurisdiction of the United States.285
Unfortunately, this portion of the opinion is also somewhat
hedged because it emphasizes the migratory nature of the species
in question. According to the opinion:
The sea turtle species here at stake, i.e., covered by Section 609,
are all known to occur in waters over which the United States
exercises jurisdiction. Of course, it is not claimed that all
populations of these species migrate to, or traverse, at one time
or another, waters subject to United States jurisdiction .... We
do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature
or extent of that limitation. We note only that in the specific
circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus
between the migratory and endangered marine populations
involved and the United States for purposes of Article
XX(g). 2
8 6
284. Id. at 152-153.
285. See generally id. at 156-157.
286. Id at 157.
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The finding that a "sufficient nexus" exists between the
United States and turtle species in the Indian Ocean strongly
suggests that any jurisdictional limitations in Article XX(g) are
fairly limited. Surely, any future effort by a GATT Panel to set a
jurisdictional limitation on Article XX(g) would seem extremely
artificial if it distinguished Shrimp-Turtle as a case that dealt only
with migratory species.
One irony of the Shrimp-Turtle opinion is the absence of any
direct discussion of the PPM issue. Section 609 is a classic PPM
measure because it singles out certain imports for special
treatment because of the manner in which they are produced.
PPMs, however, are really an Article III issue involving the
question of whether or not two products are "like" products even
though they were made differently. The litigation in Shrimp-
Turtle was shaped to address Article XX, not Article III. Thus,
many questions about environmental PPMs remain unanswered.
Overall, the Appellate Body opinion is clearly "greener" than
previous GATT cases, such as Tuna-Dolphin I and II. This
probably reflects the trade community's growing sensitivity to
environmental concerns. As the comments from the NWF suggest,
however, environmental measures will still face serious obstacles
under GATi. For example, the Appellate Body's strong
suggestion that international negotiations precede the imposition
of environmental trade measures might impede environmental
protection. Such negotiations could limit the ability of WTO
Members to act quickly and unilaterally to protect the
environment, especially because comprehensive treaties can take
years to negotiate. It also raises many practical questions. Must
negotiations result in an international agreement? Presumably
not, because Article XX was intended to permit countries to
protect important, non-trade interests, and only allowing this
pursuant to an international agreement would surely have been
mentioned in the text if it were, in fact, intended.287 But if the
287. See id. at 160. The chapeau states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any member of [the] measures
[found in paragraphs (a) through (j)]." 1I The word "party" is singular, and the words
"any contracting party..." suggest that Article XX does indeed contemplate action by a
member acting alone. See generally GATT art. XX. The sense of the words "any
contracting party " seems different from that of alternative formulations not found in the
chapeau, such as "several contracting parties operating in unison." Appellate Body
Report I, supra note 5, at 160. Even to read a bias against unilateral actions and in favor
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negotiations do not have to result in an actual agreement, then
how much of a diplomatic effort must the importing nation make?
The Appellate Body scolded the United States for failing to
engage in "serious, across-the-board" negotiations. 288 Could an
importing nation table a take-it-or-leave-it proposal and remain
"serious"? Or must it enter into protected negotiations? If so, to
what extent must it compromise its environmental objectives in
order to strike a deal? And if negotiations are unsuccessful, will
Dispute Panels review the negotiating record to determine
whether the importing nation acted in good faith and showed
sufficient flexibility? Could an importing nation use a trade
measure as a bargaining tactic to force other countries to
negotiate? Such questions likely suggest that this issue will face
litigation again.
Another problematic feature of the Shrimp-Turtle opinion is
the suggestion that the U.S. Government should not exclude
shrimp caught with TEDs simply because the exporting country
was not certified. This shrimp should have been admitted into the
United States because it was caught in a manner not threatening to
turtles. This implies that the U.S. Government is wrong to
concern itself with the practices of all shrimp fishermen in a
foreign country. Instead, it should focus only on those who export
to the United States. If this reading is correct, a foreign country
could adapt to a U.S. trade measure without requiring all of its
producers to change their practices. Only those who trade with
the United States would need to conform. This clearly limits the
ability of the U.S. Government to influence environmental
practices abroad by denying access to its huge market. Moreover,
any system relying on shipment-by-shipment inspections to
determine whether to import shrimp would be vulnerable to fraud.
From the standpoint of enforcement, it is far simpler to determine
whether or not a country has imposed a TED regime (or some
other scheme) on all of its shrimp fishermen.
Finally, future Article XX litigation could be significantly
affected by the Appellate Body's conclusion that a trade measure
is "arbitrary" if the exporting nation is not given due process
rights, such as prior notification, an opportunity to be heard,
written findings, rights of appeal, and so forth. Ideally, greater due
of international agreements into the word "unjustifiable" is something of a leap. See id.
288. See Appellate Body Report I, supra note 5, at 160.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
process will result in a more rational application of laws containing
trade measures. It will also, however, give WTO Members endless
opportunities to challenge environmental trade measures imposed
by other Members.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The litigation has not yet ended. In the aftermath of the
Appellate Body opinion, the U.S. Government intensified efforts
to negotiate a turtle protection agreement in the Indian Ocean.
This shipment-by-shipment approach was designed to address the
Appellate Body's concern that it was unjustifiable discrimination
to ban imports simply because the country of origin was not
certified. The NWF and other NGOs immediately denounced this
decision. According to the NWF:
[S]ea turtles are highly migratory species whose survival
depends upon the adoption of comprehensive, international
conservation policies .... [A] large number of sea turtles [will]
still be killed in shrimp nets if only a fraction of a nation's
shrimping fleet use[s] TEDs. Sea turtles which escaped one net
equipped with a TED (owned by a shrimper wishing to export
their catch to the U.S.) would simply be caught in the next net
which was not equipped with a TED (owned by a shrimper who
was not planning on exporting their catch to the U.S.).
289
In a preliminary decision issued on April 2, 1999, the CIT
ruled that the proposal to allow shrimp from non-certified
countries to enter the United States was "on its face, not in
accordance" with the intent of Section 609.290 The CIT, however,
asked the State Department to provide more information before it
made a final ruling.291 According to one environmentalist, the
preliminary CIT ruling raised the question of whether the United
States is able to comply with the Appellate Body's opinion without
changing Section 609.292 Notably, the Appellate Body's ruling on
unjustifiable discrimination was based on the cumulative effect of
several different problems, only one of which was the requirement
289. National Wildlife Federation, Breaking News: US State Department Reduces
Protection of Sea Turtles (visited Aug. 24, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/marrakes.htm>.
290. CIT Strikes Blow at U.S. Compliance with WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling, supra note
188, at 2.
291. See id.
292. See id.
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that shrimp come from a certified country. One of the defects was
the requirement that shrimp come from a certified country.
Should the CIT's order stand, it is unclear whether an inability to
retain a shipment-by-shipment scheme would constitute non-
compliance if the other defects are remedied. It is politically
difficult for the United States to comply with the opinion if it
means weakening the law.
The controversy and litigation stemming from Shrimp-Turtle
evidence the difficulty in resolving these issues. The trade and
environment debate erupted during the course of the Uruguay
Round (the Round) and threatened public support for those
negotiations. Although the Round did not include trade and the
environment as a topic for negotiation, environmental concerns
were nonetheless addressed as a result of the negotiations. The
Preamble to the WTO Agreement, for example, includes direct
references to the objective of sustainable development and the
need to protect and preserve the environment. In April 1994,
when Trade Ministers met in Marrakesh to approve the results of
the Round, a Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment was
adopted. It called for the creation of a Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE),293 and a broad mandate was imposed on the
CTE to identify the relationship between trade and environmental
measures in order to promote sustainable development. This
mandate also made appropriate recommendations as to whether
modifications of the multilateral trading system were required. 294
The overall aim is to make international trade and environmental
policies mutually supportive.295
That the trade and environment debate still rages is proof that
the CTE has not allayed the suspicions and concerns of the
environmental community. This failure makes Shrimp-Turtle
particularly significant. The Appellate Body's opinion
unmistakably nudged GATT jurisprudence in the direction of
providing more accommodation for the environment. It opened
the door for the use of Article XX(g) as a broad environmental
exception to basic GATT disciplines, and it rejected the extreme
293. See World Trade Organization, The Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and
Environment (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/backgrou.htm>.
294. See id.
295. See World Trade Organization, Background to WTO Work on Trade and
Environment (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/backgrou.htm>.
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jurisdictional limitations associated with the Tuna-Dolphin cases.
More broadly, the case may have changed the politics of the trade
and environment debate by refuting environmentalists who argue
that the WTO is institutionally blind to environmental and other
non-trade interests. In the long run, Shrimp-Turtle might lay the
foundation for a process where trade and the environment are
accommodated on a case-by-case basis, rather than by amendment
or interpretation of basic GATF rules. Although making the
world trading regime more environmentally friendly, the case-by-
case approach may not be the fastest. It could achieve, however,
optimal results without exposing the WTO to undue injury and ill-
considered change.
